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Abstract—This paper studies the optimization of strategies in
the context of possibly randomized two players zero-sum games
with incomplete information. We compare 5 algorithms for tuning
the parameters of strategies over a benchmark of 12 games.
A first evolutionary approach consists in designing a highly
randomized opponent (called naive opponent) and optimizing
the parametric strategy against it; a second one is optimizing
iteratively the strategy, i.e. constructing a sequence of strategies
starting from the naive one. 2 versions of coevolutions, real and
approximate, are also tested as well as a seed method. The
coevolution methods were performing well, but results were not
stable from one game to another. In spite of its simplicity, the seed
method, which can be seen as an extremal version of coevolution,
works even when nothing else works. Incidentally, these methods
brought out some unexpected strategies for some games, such as
Batawaf or the game of War, which seem, at first view, purely
random games without any structured actions possible for the
players or Guess Who, where a dichotomy between the characters
seems to be the most reasonable strategy. All source codes of
games are written in Matlab/Octave and are freely available for
download.
I. INTRODUCTION
In game theory, the case of adversarial problems where two
agents try to optimize antagonist rewards under incomplete
information is an important class of problems with real-life
applications in games, in robust optimization and in military
applications such as mission planning [1].
In a game, if the number of deterministic strategies (called
pure strategies) is finite, some stochastic strategies (called
mixed strategies or arms) are usually represented by vectors
of non-negative numbers summing to 1: a player following
a stochastic strategy x = (x1, . . . , xN ) will adopt the ith
deterministic strategy with probability xi. Defining optimality
is delicate in such a setting. We might have x performing better
than x′ against y, but x′ performing better than x against
y′. A classical approach is to find an optimum in the Nash
sense [2], [3]. In the case of finite and moderate number of
pure strategies, the literature proposes some efficient solutions
[4], [5], [6].
We are focusing on real world partially observable games
for which computing an approximate Nash equilibrium re-
quires heavy computations [7], [8], [9] and computing an exact
Nash equilibrium is undecidable [10], [11] when the horizon
is unbounded. Indeed, there are infinitely many pure strategies,
so that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
In this framework, we propose a simpler but more practical
approach: we will consider some parametric strategies. If the
parameters take a finite number of values, this boils down
to the classical multi-armed bandits problem [12]. Here, we
consider some parameters taking values in an interval of R
(hence infinitely many arms) and optimize them against a
baseline [13].
We implemented 5 methods to optimize a parametric strat-
egy: a naive evolutionary algorithm, a more sophisticated (it-
erative) one, 2 variants of coevolution and a seed method. The
naive approach consists in first designing a very randomized
baseline, covering “approximately equally” all the state space
and then optimizing a parametric strategy against it. The more
elaborate approach is to optimize iteratively a strategy pin+1
against pin. Coevolution is a different approach [14], [15].
A population P1 of agents evolves for the role of agent 1,
and another population P2 evolves for the role of agent 2.
Population P1 is optimized against population P2, whereas
population P2 is optimized against population P1. The seed
method is an extreme case of coevolution without crossover
or mutation (just random generation and selection at the end)
- generate a population as large as you can for statistically
analyzing it and just pick up the best. Section II describes
these methods.
We first compare these methods on various games (pre-
sented in Section III) in Section IV. Then we use the obtained
optima in Section V to determine some specific, detailed
strategies in games where it is not so obvious that strong
strategies exist (a strategy is strong if the probability of
winning - when using it against a fixed set of other strategies
- is significantly higher than 50%):
• Batawaf and War (card games) for which most people
believe that there is no clever strategy;
• Guess who, for which most people believe that dichotomy
is the best strategy;
• Battleship, where it is not so obvious that there is
something beyond the Monte-Carlo estimation of hitting
probabilities.
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II. ALGORITHMS
A. Preliminaries: Bernstein race as a comparison operator
Let us assume that we wish to compare two players, pa and
pb. There are several possibilities.
In the simplest method, we play 101 games between pa and
pb and select the one which wins at least 51 games. Selection
can go wrong: if the two players have close levels, the weakest
player can be selected, with probability arbitrarily close to
50%.
Let us therefore introduce a statistical test. A simple statis-
tical test consists in playing games between pa and pb, and
perform statistical tests until one of them has won significantly
more games than the other. A statistical test has a risk of
failure δ. If 20 tests are performed, then the risk that at least
one test fails is 1 − (1 − δ)20 ≈ 20δ for δ small enough (by
Taylor expansion). Therefore, without any correction, the naive
statistical test method might fail with probability arbitrarily
close to 50%.
An alternative is to play games between pa and pb, and
perform statistical tests until one of them has won significantly
more games than the other, taking into account the Bonferroni
correction [16] or other tests taking into account the multiple
nature of these tests. This is the Bernstein race [17]. Races take
care of correcting the statistical test, in order to guarantee a
given error rate δ. Whatever are the two players, the probability
that the weakest is selected is at most δ. A drawback is that it
might take a lot of time, and if the two players have exactly
the same level (in the sense that the probability of winning
is 50%), then there is a probability 1 − δ that the race never
halts. We then apply a limited race: this is the same as for
Bernstein races, except that when the winning rate is known
up to a given precision (0.01 in our experiments), the race is
stopped and the winner is the current best.
B. Naive evolutionary algorithm
A first method, termed naive (see Alg. 1) consists in
simply optimizing the average performance against a baseline,
for example the default strategy using random independent
standard Gaussian parameters.
C. Iterative evolutionary algorithm
A second simple intuitive algorithm is to accept a search
point as a new baseline as soon as it is statistically better
(winning rate > 50%) than the previous one. Many evolu-
tionary algorithms are comparison-based and can be adapted
easily to that framework. We can for example apply the (1+1)
Evolution Strategy1 [18] with games as a comparison operator,
as proposed in Alg. 2.
At first view, this algorithm looks better than the naive
one. We compare against a stronger opponent, so winning
rates should be more informative. A key question is however
whether we might have a red queen effect: algorithms winning
1Note that here, and only here, the denomination “strategy” refers to a
type of evolutionary algorithm. In the rest of the paper, “strategy” denotes the
player game plan, hence there is no ambiguity.
Algorithm 1 Naive algorithm. N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian variable
of mean a and standard deviation b. xi denotes the ith component
of x.
Input: a game simulator, a precision parameter , parameters of the random
opponent x0
σ ← 1 . Initial step-size
x← x0 . Initial strategy
while (termination criterion is not met) do
for i = 1 to length of x do
x′i ← xi + σN (0, 1) . Componentwise Mutation
end for
repeat
play a game:
• between x and x0
• between x′ and x0
until the limited Bernstein race of precision  stops
if x′ performed better than x against x0 then
x← x′
σ ← 2σ
else
σ ← 0.84σ
end if
end while
Output: an approximation x of the optimal strategy
Algorithm 2 Iterative approach. N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian
variable of mean a and standard deviation b. xi denotes the ith
component of x.
Input: a game simulator and a precision parameter , parameters of the
initial opponent x
σ ← 1 . Initial step-size
while (termination criterion is not met) do
for i = 1 to length x do
x′i ← xi + σN (0, 1) . Componentwise Mutation
end for
repeat
play games between x′ and x
until the limited Bernstein race of precision  stops
if x′ better than x then
x← x′
σ ← 2σ
else
σ ← 0.84σ
end if
end while
Output: an approximation x of the optimal strategy
against the previous generation, but becoming very special-
ized, and unable to compete with even simple tools [19], [20].
D. Coevolution
A typical coevolution considers Black players and White
players (in case of a game with a Black player and a White
player), and the fitness of the Black player is the average score
against the White population, while the fitness of a White
player is the average score against the Black population. A
classical technique (e.g. applied in [5]) considers “extended”,
“doubled” players, who have two parts: one for playing as
Black, and one for playing as White. Then, we need only one
population. This is applied in the present paper.
In the first coevolution variant, called real coevolution, a
search point is accepted in the population if it is statistically
better than every point of this population. It is presented in
Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 Real coevolution.N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian variable
of mean a and standard deviation b. xi denotes the ith component
of x.
Input: a game simulator and a precision parameter , parameters of the
initial opponent x.
σ ← 1 . Initial step-size
P ← {x} . Best points population
while (termination criterion is not met) do
for i = 1 to length of x do
x′i ← xi + σN (0, 1) . Mutation
end for
repeat
play a game between x′ and every point of P
until each limited Bernstein race of precision  stops
if x′ performed better than all points in P then
x← x′
P ← {P, x′}
σ ← 2σ
else
σ ← 0.84σ
end if
end while
Output: an approximation x of the optimal strategy
We might consider the population as a representation of a
stochastic strategy, i.e., the global strategy is randomly drawn
in the population for each game the artificial intelligence had
to play: this is the so-called “Parisian approach” [21]. Our
second variant of coevolution, called approximate coevolution
(see Alg. 4), is related to this approach. Instead of comparing
the search point to each point of the population, it is only
compared to one point of the population drawn at random.
Algorithm 4 Approximate coevolution. N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian
variable of mean a and standard deviation b. xi denotes the ith
component of x.
Input: a game simulator and a precision parameter , parameters of the
initial opponent x.
σ ← 1 . Initial step-size
P ← {x} . Best points population
while (termination criterion is not met) do
for i = 1 to length of x do
x′i ← xi + σN (0, 1) . Componentwise Mutation
end for
Draw at random an integer rand between 1 and the size of P
repeat play a game between x′ and the randth individual of P
until the limited Bernstein race of precision  stops
if x′ performed better then
x← x′
P ← {P, x′}
σ ← 2σ
else
σ ← 0.84σ
end if
end while
Output: an approximation x of the optimal strategy
E. Method of seeds
[22], [23], [24], [25], [26] proposed a new method for op-
timizing an artificial intelligence, which can be applied to our
setting. The principle is to generate a population of K random
individuals for the first player, and another population of K
random individuals for the second player. Then, we consider
all pairwise games (a more subtle method was proposed in
[25] but we do not consider this in the present paper). We
then select the player with best average performance. Both
populations can be equal when the game is symmetric, and
we might increase K until the time budget is elapsed in order
to be anytime.
III. GAMES
The games are fully described in our open source platform
(https://gforge.inria.fr/projects/gametestbed/). We provide a
short description below.
A. Brief description
Batawaf and game of War: The cards, kept unknown
from the two players, are randomly distributed among them.
At each turn, each player reveal simultaneously the card at
the top of their deck. The player with the highest valued card
wins the cards and put them at the bottom of his/her deck. In
case of draw, the two players place a second card, face down,
on the pile, then a third one face up. The process is possibly
repeated until the winner of the turn can be determined. The
player who gets all the cards wins the game. The difference
between Batawaf and War is the total number of cards and in
the number of cards of same strength.
Battleship: Two players place secretly four ships of size
2, 3, 4 and 5 on a 9×9 board without crossing, horizontally or
vertically. In each round, each player in turn propose a position
on the board, trying to find out a ship of the adversary. The first
player to have found all parts of all ships of her/his opponent
wins. At each turn the player is informed of whether he has
touched something.
Cheat: The cheat game uses 52 cards of 4 different
colors. The cards are randomly distributed among the players.
One of the players puts a first card on the table. The color of
this card is termed the “current color”. Then, each player, in
turn, either puts a card (face hidden) on top of the previous
one2 or claims “cheat”. In the latter case, if the last played
card was of the current color, the person who claimed “cheat”
receives all the cards currently on the table. Otherwise, the
previous player receives all the cards currently on the table.
In both cases, a new round start, with the player who received
all the cards putting a chosen card, which decides the new
current color. The first player who gets rid of all his/her cards
wins the game.
Flip: In the flip game, cards are randomly distributed
among the two players. Only the five topmost cards are visible
(for both players). When a card is removed, another one is
made visible. Both players, in turn3, put one of their cards (if
they can) on top of one of the two visible cards on the table.
A card may be put on top of the card if it is the card just
above or just below in the ranking - except that the strongest
card can be put on the weakest and the weakest can be put
on the strongest. The first player who gets rid of all his cards
wins the game.
2(s)he can choose the color of the card.
3The game is also played as a speed game, with players playing as soon
as they can instead of playing in turn.
Guess who: Each player privately draws a number be-
tween 1 and 128. At each round, in turn, each player asks
the other if his/her number is in the first x numbers (the
player chooses x). The answer must be sincere, so that
some possibilities can be can removed. The first player who
determines the number chosen by the other wins.
Morra: In the Morra game, both players simultaneously
announce (i) a number of fingers (usually by showing with the
hand) between 0 and 5 and (ii) a guessed number between 0
and 10. If the sum of the numbers of fingers is equal to the
guess of one (and only one) player, then this player wins the
game (otherwise, the game is a draw).
Phantom 4 in row: It is the stochastic version of 4 in row.
In a 4x7 grid, at each turn, the players choose a permutation of
the 7 locations and a move, without observation of the game.
If the chosen location is already full, the stone goes to the next
location according to the permutation. The first player with 4
stones aligned wins.
Phantom tic tac toe: The tic tac toe game, in 3x3, is
well known and not very challenging. In the phantom version,
a permutation of the 9 locations is chosen. A player cannot see
her opponent’s moves. Whenever a player chooses a location
already occupied, the move is switched to the next location
in the order of the permutation. Finding a strong strategy in
Phantom tic tac toe is far less trivial than for tic tac toe.
Other games: Other games in the platform are not
partially observable: Pig is a dice game, Nim (a.k.a. Marienbad
game) is well known as a misery game; four-in-a-row is
famous. For these games our approaches are not likely to be
meaningful and these results are just included for shedding
light on the genericness of our methods.
B. Parametric strategies
The strategies will not be detailed here. They can be down-
loaded at http://www.lri.fr/∼teytaud/gametestbed.html. They
are roughly described in Table I.
IV. RESULTS
Scores against the baseline: Table II presents the score
of each method against the original default parametrization.
Each learning is performed only once; methods in which no
iteration was obtained are not displayed. Each method was run
24 hours. Seed was not run for “Guess Who” variants.
Comparison between 4 optimization methods: We now
compare strategies obtained by our different methods against
each other rather than against the original baseline. Numerical
results are displayed in Table III. All results are obtained after
24 hours of learning.
V. DETAILED STRATEGIES
This section studies some specific games, and shows that our
parametric strategies could find out some surprisingly strong
strategies against the baselines. Some of these strategies can
make you really strong at Guess who (which was already
known, but we provide human readable strategies) and at
Batawaf or War (which is more unexpected).
A. Batawaf and game of War: good cards first!
The rules do not specify in which order the cards won by
a player should be added at the end of the deck. This order
has an impact on the length of games, and on the probability
that the game finishes: loops are possible, see [28]. We here
stop the game and consider it as a draw after 1 million moves
without conclusion.
Considered strategies: We consider 4 parameters, namely
A,B,C,D, which are converted into non-negative parameters
using a = exp(A), b = exp(B), c = exp(C), d = exp(D).
Then, when we must put k won cards in our deck (at the end),
their order is chosen as follows:
1) d is used as a seed for generating a permutation pi of
{1, 2, . . . , k};
2) σ is a permutation of {1, 2, . . . , k}:
• uniformly drawn with probability a/(a+ b+ c);
• equal to {1, 2, . . . , k} with probability b/(a+ b+ c);
• equal to {k, k−1, . . . , 1} with probability c/(a+b+c);
3) the cards are put in ascending order and shuffled using
permutation pi ◦ σ.
Results & discussion : For some specific values, we
therefore get the following human-readable strategy: put the
cards at the end of your deck in decreasing order, the best
card first. This strategy is termed “descending” in the rest of
this paper. The naive strategy consists in randomly sorting the
card. The ascending strategy is the opposite of the descending
one. An alternate version with 3 parameters uses only A,B,C
and the identity for pi. Its optimization was much faster,
immediately converging to the use of descending order, our
best strategy so far.
In batawaf, the descending strategy gets winning rate 68.8%
against the naive strategy, 57.5% against the ascending strat-
egy, and 50% against itself (tested on 10000 games). In War,
the corresponding performances are 70.0%, 53.3% and 50%.
B. Guess who: play risky moves when late!
In many cases, we have an intuitive understanding of what
is a “risky” move, and more precisely a “good risky move”.
It is a move which, simultaneously, maximizes the expected
long term reward, and has a large probability of making, at
a tactical level, the situation worse than if we had played a
simple move.
In games, choosing the right level of risk depends on the
current situation. If the goal is to win, then, in a territory game
such as Go, ensuring an almost sufficient territory is mean-
ingless; it is better to have a 5% probability of having more
territory than your opponent, rather than a probability 100% of
having just a little bit less territory than your opponent. There-
fore, the “shobute” (http://senseis.xmp.net/?Shobute) principle
states that, if you are behind in a game of Go, it is time for a
risky attack. Another case occurs when playing a sequence of
games, with, e.g., half a point in case of draw, one point in case
of win, and zero in case of loss. Then, the player in advance
might prefer to play very safely, ensuring a draw, whereas the
other must play risky. Here, we investigate the case of Guess
Game Number of Info Stochasticy of the The optimal strategy
parameters strategies must be stochastic
War 3/4 Probability of selecting the ascending order, prob. of selecting the descend-
ing order, probability of random order, perturbation of the selected ranking,
see Section V-A
No/Yes ?
Batawaf 3/4 idem War idem idem
Battleship 33 Parameters of the probability distribution for the ships Yes Yes
Cheat 28/29 Parameters of a randomly perturbed quadratic value function; the 29th
optional parameter (variant called “special”) is an arbitrary perturbation of
the value function, built pseudo-randomly from that parameter
Yes Yes
Flip 420 Parameters of a quadratic value function No No
Guess who (determinis-
tic/stochastic)
4/5 Nonlinear expert strategy based on a risk level based on the gap (see [27]
and Section V-B)
No/Yes No
Morra 66 Vector of probabilities for all possible joint actions Yes Yes
Nim 383 Complete value function over the 383 non-terminal states No No
Phantom 4-in-a-row 2 Complete pure strategy (i.e. index of the chosen list of moves when playing
first and index of the chosen list of moves when playing second)
No ?
Phantom tic-tac-toe 18 Complete pure strategy No Yes
4-in-a-row 14 Parameter of the Monte-Carlo strategy Yes∗ No
TABLE I: Characteristics of the parametric strategies for each game: number of parameters and stochasticity or not of the strategies. ∗
denote “yes” for strategies which are stochastic only by the finiteness of samples and/or draws in Monte-Carlo simulations.
Game Method Score against baseline
4-in-a-row
Seed 0.63 ± 0.03
Iterative 1 ± 0
Naive 0.75 ± 0.19
Real coevol 0.442308 ± 0.10
Batawaf4
Seed 0.606 ± 0.004
Coevol 0.626 ± 0.005
Iterative 0.626 ± 0.004
Naive 0.620 ± 0.004
Real coevol 0.544 ± 0.003
Batawaf
Seed 0.627 ± 0.004
Coevol 0.626912 ± 0.005
Iterative 0.626671 ± 0.004
Naive 0.628467 ± 0.004
Real coevol 0.443975 ± 0.003
Cheat
Seed 0.845 ± 0.003
cheat, Coevol 0.783318 ± 0.006
Iterative 0.817416 ± 0.029
Naive 0.802905 ± 0.011
Real coevol 0.810882 ± 0.007
Flip
Seed 0.554 ± 0.04
Coevol 0.597727 ± 0.017
Iterative 0.588 ± 0.022
Naive 0.593143 ± 0.017
Real coevol 0.591314 ± 0.016
Game Method Score against baseline
Guess who-deter
Coevol 0.785714 ± 0.113804
Naive 0.613484 ± 0.000513042
Real coevol 0.597514 ± 0.00160714
Guess who
Coevol 0.679± 0.130
Iterative 0.771± 0.0876
Naive 1 ± 0
Real coevol 0.615 ± 0.00158
Cheat-Special
Seed 0.6405 ± 0.02
Coevol 0.64 ± 0.016
Iterative 0.58 ± 0.01
Naive 0.65 ± 0.027
Real coevol 0.62 ± 0.027
Battleship Seed 0.77
Morra
Seed 0.519 ± 0.0013
Coevol 0.526 ± 0.0012
Iterative 0.527 ± 0.0016
Naive 0.523± 0.001
Real coevol 0.518 ± 0.001
Nim
Seed 0.74 ± 0.0003
Coevol 0.500 ± 0.0007
Iterative 0.589 ± 0.002
Real coevol 0.669 ± 0.002
Game Method Score against baseline
Phantom-4-in-a-row
Seed 0.69 ± 0.003
Coevol 0.549± 0.00096
Iterative 0.657± 0.004
Real coevol 0.598 ± 0.003
Phantom-tic-tac-toe
Seed 0.75 ± 0.0012
Coevol 0.445 ± 0.000497
Iterative 0.595 ± 0.00138
Naive 0.445 ± 0.000497
Real coevol 0.696 ± 0.0011
Pig
Seed 0.505 ± 0.003
Coevol 0.507889 ± 0.0012
Iterative 0.522151 ± 0.002
Naive 0.512262 ± 0.0016
Real coevol 0.508092 ± 0.0016
War4
Seed 0.623 ± 0.017
Coevol 0.623288 ± 0.016
Iterative 0.669± 0.05
Naive 0.605± 0.018
Real coevol 0.553± 0.010
War
Seed 0.632 ± 0.003
Coevol 0.517 ± 0.00666
Iterative 0.653 ± 0.012
Naive 0.632 ± 0.018
Real coevol 0.487 ± 0.005
TABLE II: Scores (winning rates) of each method against the original default parametrization. The standard deviation is shown after
±. Despite the fact that the naive method is directly optimizing the target criterion, other methods are competitive. The seed method is
particularly robust. Batawaf4 (resp. War4) denotes the Batawaf (resp. War) strategy with 4 parameters.
who and show that, contrarily to what is usually assumed, the
optimal strategy must consider the necessity of taking risks.
Let us discuss the Guess who game. First, for any arbitrary
subset of your characters, you can design a question which
discriminates exactly this subset. This can be done by using
long questions (“is your character Tom or Jean or Pierre
or Chang-Shing?”), or the alphabetic order. Randomizing
the permutation, we get a strategy which is invariant by
permutation of the characters. As a consequence, the order and
traits do not matter. We can therefore work in a permutation-
invariant manner, and just split between the c first and the
n − c last characters, when we have a list of n characters.
c < 1 or c > n − 1 do not make any sense; therefore we
have n − 2 possible actions (up to symmetries) when we
have n characters. Using these symmetries, the state of our
set of characters become simply a number between 1 and
N , where N is the original number of characters. This state
is just the number of remaining characters. We can use the
number of characters in the opponent’s set as well, as a side
information; we might want to make more risky decisions
(farther from equal split) when we have a bad situation. This
is precisely the point in this paper. As a consequence, up
to symmetries (permutations of our characters and of the
opponent’s characters) our strategy uses as an input the pair
(n,m) (n is our number of characters and m is the number
of characters of our opponent) and outputs 1 < c < n− 2.
A simple first remark is that dichotomy (constructing a
question such that approximately half characters correspond
to “yes”) is a reasonably good strategy. As pointed out in
boardgamegeek.com/thread/302791/advanced-strategies, when you
are late, you should not apply the dichotomy otherwise you
are just going to lose. Instead, you should use risky strategies,
with which you might win early. This reference also considers
hiding the current size of the set of characters. They however
do not provide any experiment or formalization of strategies.
Cheat (28 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.0269(+-0.003) 0.017(+-0.002) 0.977(+-0.002)
iterative 0.973(+-0.003) 0.5(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.008) 0.502(+-0.008)
approx. coevol 0.983(+-0.002) 0.5(+-0.008) 0.5(+- 0) 0.671(+-0.008)
real coevol 0.0235(+-0.002) 0.498(+-0.008) 0.329(+-0.008) 0.5(+- 0)
GuessWho-deter (4 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.8(+-0.004) 0.489(+-0.005) 0.498(+-0.005)
iterative 0.2(+-0.004) 0.5(+- 0) 0.208(+-0.004) 0.14(+-0.004)
approx. coevol 0.511(+-0.005) 0.792(+-0.004) 0.5(+- 0) 0.502(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.502(+-0.005) 0.86(+-0.004) 0.498(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
GuessWho (5 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.276(+-0.005) 0.159(+-0.004) 0.34(+-0.005)
iterative 0.724(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.424(+-0.005) 0.583(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.841(+-0.004) 0.576(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.563(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.66(+-0.005) 0.417(+-0.005) 0.437(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
Phantom-4-in-a-row (2 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005) 1(+- 0) 0.75(+-0.004)
iterative 0.5(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 1(+- 0) 0(+- 0)
approx. coevol 0(+- 0) 0(+- 0) 0.5(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.25(+-0.004) 1(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
Nim (383 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005) 0(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005)
iterative 0.5(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0(+- 0) 0(+- 0)
approx. coevol 1(+- 0) 1(+- 0) 0.5(+- 0) 0(+- 0)
real coevol 0.5(+-0.005) 1(+- 0) 1(+- 0) 0.5(+- 0)
Phantom-tic-tac-toe (18 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.75(+-0.004) 0.5(+-0.005) 0.5(+-0.005)
iterative 0.25(+-0.004) 0.5(+- 0) 0(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.5(+-0.005) 1(+- 0) 0.5(+- 0) 0(+- 0)
real coevol 0.5(+-0.005) 0.5(+-0.005) 1(+- 0) 0.5(+- 0)
Morra (66 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.472(+-0.005) 0.472(+-0.005) 0.477(+-0.005)
iterative 0.528(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.475(+-0.005) 0.483(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.528(+-0.005) 0.525(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.482(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.523(+-0.005) 0.517(+-0.005) 0.518(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
4-in-a-row (14 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.427(+-0.05) 0.494(+-0.06) 0.503(+-0.06)
iterative 0.573(+-0.05) 0.5(+- 0) 0.494(+-0.06) 0.57(+-0.06)
approx. coevol 0.506(+-0.06) 0.506(+-0.06) 0.5(+- 0) 0.604(+-0.05)
real coevol 0.497(+-0.06) 0.43(+-0.06) 0.396(+-0.05) 0.5(+- 0)
Flip (420 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.428(+-0.005) 0.439(+-0.005) 0.439(+-0.005)
iterative 0.572(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.437(+-0.005) 0.432(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.561(+-0.005) 0.563(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.437(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.561(+-0.005) 0.568(+-0.005) 0.563(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
Pig (1 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.496(+-0.005) 0.502(+-0.005) 0.505(+-0.005)
iterative 0.504(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.506(+-0.005) 0.498(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.498(+-0.005) 0.494(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.502(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.495(+-0.005) 0.502(+-0.005) 0.498(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
Batawaf (3 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.49(+-0.005) 0.501(+-0.005) 0.701(+-0.005)
iterative 0.51(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.497(+-0.005) 0.698(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.499(+-0.005) 0.503(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.693(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.299(+-0.005) 0.302(+-0.005) 0.307(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
War (3 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.453(+-0.006) 0.495(+-0.006) 0.508(+-0.006)
iterative 0.547(+-0.006) 0.5(+- 0) 0.563(+-0.006) 0.708(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.505(+-0.006) 0.437(+-0.006) 0.5(+- 0) 0.492(+-0.006)
real coevol 0.492(+-0.006) 0.292(+-0.005) 0.508(+-0.006) 0.5(+- 0)
Batawaf4 (4 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.311(+-0.005) 0.301(+-0.005) 0.385(+-0.005)
iterative 0.689(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.507(+-0.005) 0.562(+-0.005)
approx. coevol 0.699(+-0.005) 0.493(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0) 0.573(+-0.005)
real coevol 0.615(+-0.005) 0.438(+-0.005) 0.427(+-0.005) 0.5(+- 0)
War4 (4 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.489(+-0.008) 0.495(+-0.008) 0.493(+-0.008)
iterative 0.511(+-0.008) 0.5(+- 0) 0.424(+-0.008) 0.47(+-0.008)
approx. coevol 0.505(+-0.008) 0.576(+-0.008) 0.5(+- 0) 0.576(+-0.008)
real coevol 0.507(+-0.008) 0.53(+-0.008) 0.424(+-0.008) 0.5(+- 0)
Cheat-Special (29 params)
vs naive vs itera. vs ap. coevol vs coevol
naive 0.5(+- 0) 0.497(+-0.01) 0.499(+-0.01) 0.5(2th +-0.01)
iterative 0.503(+-0.01) 0.5(+- 0) 0.658(+-0.01) 0.5(+-0.01)
approx. coevol 0.501(+-0.01) 0.342(+-0.01) 0.5(+- 0) 0.5(+-0.01)
real coevol 0.5(+-0.01) 0.5(+-0.01) 0.5(+-0.01) 0.5(+- 0)
TABLE III: Comparison in terms of winning rate between the naive and iterative approaches and coevolution. The value after ‘±’ is the
standard deviation. The best method (if any) if the one which wins with probability at least 50% against all others. It is indicated in bold.
It is possible that more than one method wins with probability at least 50% against all others (e.g., for “Phantom-tic-tac-toc”, it is the case
for naive and real coevolution, however, naive is better). The coevolution methods dominate in most case (in 8 games over 13).
Strategies: The dichotomy strategy is simply:
(n,m) 7→ bn/2c.
A general strategy, which covers the dichotomy case, is:
piα,β(n,m) = max
(
1,
⌊
βr
n− 1
2
+ (1− β)
(
n
2
− αmax(n−m, 0)
2
)⌋)
,
(1)
with α ∈ R, β ∈ R and r ∈ [0, 1] drawn uniformly at random.
It will turn out, however, that β > 0 is a poor strategy. We
can further extend it by including non-linear terms:
piα,β,γ(n,m) = max
(
1,
⌊
βr
n− 1
2
+ (1− β)
(
n
2
− αδm
2
+ γ
n
2
δ2m
n2
)⌋)
,
(2)
where δm = max(n−m, 0)/2, α ∈ R, β ∈ R, γ ∈ R and r
as in Eq. 1.
We can consider yet another formula, using β = 0 and
introducing two new parameters ζ ∈ R and ι ∈ R, as follows:
piα,γ,ζ,ι(n,m) = max
(
1,
⌊
n
2
− αδm
2
+ γ
n
2
δ2m
n2
+ ζ
n
2
δ3m
n3
+ ι
n−m
2
⌋)
,
(3)
with α ∈ R, γ ∈ R and δm as in Eq. 2.
Results and discussion: Strategies of Eqs. 1, 2 and 3 are
first optimized in terms of winning rate against the dichotomy
strategy (4 hours of optimization). It is a simple application of
the naive approach. Since it appeared that β > 0 in Eqs. 1 and
2 leads to poor strategies, we dismissed this term (i.e. β = 0).
At this step, the optimal strategy then corresponds to α = 1
and β = 0 in Eq. 1, or equivalently , α = 1 and β = 0 and
γ = 0 in Eq. 2, or equivalently α = 1 and γ = ζ = ι = 0 in
Eq. 3. We call this strategy optimal linear, shortened in OL.
Second, applying the iterative approach, we optimize a
family of non-linear strategies ( Eq. 3) by maximizing the
winning rate against the OL strategy, using Eq. 2 under
constraint β = 0 (4 hours of optimization). The optimal
parameters are α = − 14 and γ = − 32 , ζ = ι = 0. This
strategy is termed optimal nonlinear, denoted ONL.
Finally, in one more step of the iterative approach, a better
4-parameter strategy, termed ‘ Best”, optimal strategy against
ONL (4 hours of optimization), is obtained with α = −0.56,
γ = −1.58, ζ = −0.06, ι = −0.022 in Eq. 3.
[27] pointed out the existence of an analytical optimal
strategy: it is used in our tests. Results are presented in Fig.
1. We see (right) that ONL wins against OL, as well as Best.
Best wins against ONL (middle), but against God (the optimal
strategy) only OL reaches 50%. The naive approach can be
“exploited” (in the Nash sense: a strategy specialized against
it will outperform it) but it is quite strong both against the
baseline and against God (approximately 50%: see left).
C. Cheat game: ensuring some draw
At the cheat game, both the naive and iterative methods
found a strategy with a lot of draws. Observing games, we
could extract the following optimal strategy, ensuring a draw:
1) If your opponent has more than 3 cards, play an arbitrary
strategy.
2) If your opponent has 2 or 3 cards, and it is your turn to
choose a current color, then put a card of a color that he
does not have, and say “cheat” when he plays; he has
now more than 2 cards.
3) If your opponent has 3 cards and it is your turn to put
a card (the current color already being set), then say
“cheat”. Either he has cheated and has now more than
3 cards, or not and you are now in the situation of point
2.
This strategy ensures that the opponent has never less than 2
cards.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Comparing algorithms
For many games, simulating the current hidden state con-
ditionally to partial observation is tricky, and mathematically
principled algorithms for this4 are hardly available. For such
games, implementing a parametric strategy and optimizing
the parameters (possibly with zero human knowledge) works:
we obtained new interesting strategies in Cheat (never-losing
strategy, found before humans solved it), Guess who (on par
with mathematically exact method), War & Batawaf (strategy
choosing the order of won cards put at the end of one’s
desk). In phantom cases and some others we just optimize
the complete deterministic strategy, i.e., we use zero human
knowledge. Inside this general principle of little or zero ex-
pertise parametric policy optimization, comparing algorithms
is difficult; the conclusions are never clear and universal. We
cannot claim a strong superiority of any of our methods against
other ones. We might advocate a portfolio of methods, i.e.,
testing several methods.
For partially observable games, rankings between players
are not clear. The Elo model [29] does not apply because
superiority at a given game is not transitive (see the 4 strategies
4Keep in mind the undecidability result in [10], which shows that a general
algorithm for belief state information cannot exist in the general case of
partially observable game.
obtained for phantom-tic-tac-toe by the naive method, the
iterative method, coevolution and approximate coevolution).
Cycles make the naive and iterative method risky and sensitive
to the red queen effect.
The iterative method is appealing compared to the naive
one when the Elo model applies, because optimizing against a
fixed baseline might become very hard, in particular when the
success rate is already quite high, so that fitness evaluations
are not very informative - a Bernstein race between candidates
close to 100% winning rate is very slow.
Results on Guess who, including the mathematical exact
optimum, show that we can compete in a couple of lines of
code and a few hours of computation with a mathematical
analysis (see the OL method, obtained by naive optimiza-
tion against the dichotomy). However, our method can be
(slightly) exploited by a method optimized specifically against
it, whereas the mathematical method cannot (by definition, and
our experiments confirm this) be exploited (Fig. 1).
The most surprising results for us was the successes of the
seed method. This method just generates a large population,
and simulates games (possibly in a more clever manner than
full Round-Robin, see e.g. [25]) for choosing the best -
coevolution, but with no mutation, no iteration, no crossover,
just random generation and selection.
In particular, it does work when nothing works, e.g. in the
battleship case (too expensive for other methods - we have
time for only 54 games in this platform in the considered time
setting!), or when the strategy is very poorly parametrized so
that even a trivial game becomes complicated (e.g. Nim). It
was never far from the best, except when it was possible to
solve exactly the game with 100% winning rate against the
baseline as in 4-in-a-row.
B. Results on specific games
In Batawaf and the card game of War, we provide a surpris-
ingly strong heuristic. To the best of our knowledge, nobody
ever published such strong strategies at these games, while
War is one of the most widely played games in the world.
We get close to 70% winning rate against the baseline that
most people play. In Battleship, we provide both a probability
distribution for the initial positioning of the fleet and for the
Monte-Carlo simulation of the opponent’s fleet. Only the seed
method could find something meaningful. In Guess who, we
provide a strategy which is on par with the mathematically
derived optimum, which is the key output of a paper published
as a mathematical study. The algorithm derived, by itself, an
application of the “shobute” principle, namely we should have
more risky decisions when we are late. We ran our experiments
before the mathematical solution was published. At Cheat, we
get a strong strategy, including against humans. This was found
by computers before being understood by humans.
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